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to act, selfishly or otherwise, is a testament to the importance of
cooperation in both the processes and the outcomes of evolution
(Buss 1987; Maynard Smith & Szathma´ry 1995/1997; Michod
1999; Ridley 2001).
If any field, including the study of behavior, is to lay claim to
being a true science, it must without hesitation relinquish any
assumptions or models that do not conform to ongoing and
unbiased observations of empirical reality.
The integrative framework for the
behavioural sciences has already been
discovered, and it is the adaptationist approach
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Abstract: The adaptationist framework is necessary and sufficient for
unifying the social and natural sciences. Gintis’s “beliefs, preferences,
and constraints” (BPC) model compares unfavorably to this framework
because it lacks criteria for determining special design, incorrectly
assumes that standard evolutionary theory predicts individual rationality
maximisation, does not adequately recognize the impact of psychological
mechanisms on culture, and is mute on the behavioural implications of
intragenomic conflict.
The unification of the behavioural sciences, and their integration
with the rest of natural science, is currently taking place within a
neo-Darwinian framework which views all organisms as bundles
of adaptations (Tooby & Cosmides 1992). Gintis’s “beliefs, pre-
ferences, and constraints” model (BPC) provides no convincing
arguments for why it is a meaningful addition to the existing
framework. Below we summarize why the existing framework is
a necessary and sufficient one for unifying the disciplines.
An adaptation is a phenotypic device that was designed by
selection to allow its encoding genes to outreplicate genes for
rival devices. As the fundamental organisational principle of
organismal tissue, adaptation is as indispensable to understand-
ing human behaviour as it is to understanding any organismal
trait. This does not mean, of course, that all traits are adaptations,
but rather that, in order to understand organismal design, one
must determine whether particular traits are adaptations, by-
products of adaptations, or random noise. In order to establish
that a trait is an adaptation, there must be evidence of special
design (Williams 1966); that is, evidence that the trait was
designed by selection for the specific purpose of solving a par-
ticular (set of) problem(s). Because BPC does not include criteria
for testing for the existence of special design, it is often unable to
determine whether a trait is an adaptation or not.
For example, Gintis notes that subjects in economic games
often violate the predictions of traditional economic theory,
and he concludes that their behaviour evidences an evolutionary
process that favoured those who consistently behaved in indivi-
dually fitness-damaging ways. However, people engage in many
kinds of apparently fitness-damaging behaviours in novel
environments (including experimental economic laboratories),
and the observation of such behaviour is not a sufficient basis
on which to conclude that the behaviour evolved for the
purpose of producing a fitness-damaging outcome. It is as if,
upon observing that many men spend significant time and
money consuming pornography, thereby irrationally foregoing
real mating opportunities, one were to conclude that a “prefer-
ence” for pornography is the product of selection for fitness-
damaging behaviour. However, pornography’s popularity is
more likely a result of semi-autonomous psychological mechan-
isms that evolved in a pornography-free world. Because there
is no evidence that these mechanisms were specially designed
for pornography, pornography’s popularity is not evidence of
selection for individually fitness-damaging behaviour.
Because BPC does not recognize that adaptations are not
necessarily predicted to produce adaptive outcomes in novel
environments, it overestimates the degree to which evolutionary
theory predicts behaviour that maximizes fitness and/or utility.
The psychological mechanisms governing behaviour are con-
ditional decision-rules that respond to specific environmental
information by producing specific psychological and behavioural
outcomes. Therefore, evolutionary theory casts individuals as
“adaptation executers,” not “rational choosers” or ”fitness maxi-
misers” (Tooby & Cosmides 1992). This framework can, in prin-
ciple, explain individual performance on a range of decision tasks;
it can explain why people are good at reasoning about some pro-
blems and not others, why they make particular kinds of systema-
tic mistakes, and so on. However, Gintis regards evolutionary
psychology as predicting that individuals are rational actors
who choose the available course of action that they expect will
maximise their fitness. Therefore, according to Gintis, irrational-
ity presents a problem for evolutionary theory, one that BPC
attempts to solve by incorporating a host of ad hoc – albeit
well-measured – anomalies, constraints, preferances, and biases.
BPC explains cultural transmission in terms of psychological
mechanisms for various forms of imitation (prestige-biased,
popularity-related, etc.), and this appears to be an effort to
ground cultural evolution in genetic/brain evolution. Although
we endorse this effort, the ways in which psychological mechan-
isms generate and embrace/reject cultural characteristics are far
richer than can be captured by an emphasis on general-purpose
imitation mechanisms alone. Differences in cultural evolutionary
trajectories are largely the products of psychological mechanisms
responding to different environments. For example, in an
environment offering many benefits from group cooperation
(one characterized by large game, coalitional conflict, etc.),
psychological adaptations for cooperation may be deployed
more often than in an environment offering few such benefits,
and the environment offering more benefits may therefore
elicit a more cooperative culture. In both cultures, certain
specialized imitation mechanisms may indeed help individuals
learn how to behave; however, an emphasis on imitation alone
would overlook the psychological mechanisms that determined
each culture’s orientation in the first place. Moreover, a more
useful theory of, say, prestige-biased imitation would illuminate
not just the potential benefits of imitating successful individuals,
but also the potential costs (for example, if a subordinate acts as if
he or she has as much power as a dominant individual, this may
anger the dominant individual).
BPC’s ability to predict sophisticated imitation processes is
also limited by its failure to recognize the potential importance
of intragenomic conflict in decision-making and social behaviour
(Haig 2000). A focus on strategic genes influencing the design of
psychologcal mechanisms helps elucidate why imitating a model
individual may have differiential costs to matrilineal versus
patrilineal inclusive fitness (Brown 2001; Trivers 2000). Indeed,
BPC is predictively mute on all forms of intragenomic conflict,
and therefore on how individual preferences may conflict and/
or be suppressed by rival psychological mechanisms (e.g., see
Haig [2003] on intrapersonal reciprocity). This suggests that
BPC is not up to the task of uniting the social and natural
sciences, especially in the age of genomics.
In conclusion, we favour increased integration among the
behavioural sciences. However, BPC would be inhibited in
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achieving this goal, and in achieving the more ambitious and pro-
ductive goal of integrating the social and natural sciences,
because it does not identify the modern theory of adaptation
by natural selection as the core integrating principle. Integration
would be better accomplished by the non-zoocentric adaptation-
ist framework that already exists (Darwin 1859; Haig 2003;
Hamilton 1964; Tooby & Cosmides 1992; Trivers 1971; 1972;
1974; Williams 1966), and it is not clear that BPC contributes
to the progress that this framework continues to make.
Information processing as one key for a
unification?
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Abstract: The human information-acquisition process is one of the
unifying mechanisms of the behavioral sciences. Three examples (from
psychology, neuroscience, and political science) demonstrate that
through inspection of this process, better understanding and hence
more powerful models of human behavior can be built. The target
method for this – process tracing – could serve as a central player in
this building process of a unified framework.
The unification of different scientific disciplines such as
economics, biology, psychology, and political science under
the rubric of the “behavioral sciences” can ultimately provide
a better understanding of human beings’ cognition, behavior,
and interactions. Based on Gintis’s framework in the target
article, questions would be asked differently, and their answers
would have a broader impact. Such a unification demands the
rethinking of theoretical and methodological issues in each of
the affected disciplines. In this commentary I argue that the
detailed inspection of the human information-acquisition
process in different disciplines helps in building such a frame-
work. In particular, process tracing can serve as a central
method in this endeavor.
Process tracing has been primarily studied in the psychology of
decision making (Ford et al. 1989) and uses different methods for
recording what information is attended to and when that atten-
tion occurs and shifts. Thinking aloud, eye tracking, protocol
analysis, and information boards are common methods. They
rest on the assumption that the recorded information-acquisition
steps resemble closely cognitive processes within the human
brain. A substantial body of evidence (Harte et al. 1994; Payne
et al. 1993; Russo 1978; Schkade & Johnson 1989) has been
developed over the last 20 years to support this claim. Here I
will highlight three examples from different domains to show
how process tracing methods have been used and what benefits
arise in comparison to more traditional input-output models.
The first example uses an information board approach to find
underlying patterns in information acquisition when simple
gambles are used. Brandsta¨tter et al. (2006) suggested a simple
descriptive model of people making decisions between two
gambles (with two and five outcomes). This method, called the
Priority Heuristic (PH), sets the focus (for two-outcome
gambles, in decreasing order) on the minimum gain, probability
of the minimum gain, and the maximum gain. Using the PH, the
authors predicted choices given the use of the heuristic, and pre-
scribed in detail the sequence in which the different items should
be accessed. Johnson et al. (under review) compared the process
steps of the PH with their observed usage in a process tracing
study using the same gambles. It becomes clear when the data
of this study are inspected that there are some predictions of
PH actually met in the process data; for example, more attention
is set to gains in a first reading phase than to probabilities.
However, there are several predictions which do not hold
when the process level is examined. One of the stronger predic-
tions PH makes is that there should be no transitions between
gains and their corresponding probabilities. However, in the
Johnson et al. data, this is the most frequent transition found
across the different gambles and can be interpreted as integration
of the gain-probability pairs into an expected value.
The second example brings us into the domain of neuro-
science. Fellows (2006) used an information board approach to
identify differences in information-acquisition strategies in a
group of participants with damage in the ventromedial frontal
lobe (VFL) in comparison with a healthy group (as well as with
a frontal lobe–damaged group where the VFL was still intact).
Strong differences between the VFL and the control groups
were found in terms of which strategy was used to gather infor-
mation. Generally, a preference for attribute-based search strat-
egies was found. In the VFL group, a different pattern, with
dominating search in alternative-based order, resulted. One
important detail of this study is that the absolute amount of infor-
mation and the time taken to come to a decision were the same in
both groups – nevertheless, the underlying strategy in infor-
mation acquisition differed strongly.
The third example demonstrates the usage of process tracing
techniques in the political sciences. Redlawsk (2004) examined
the information search process of voters in an election exper-
iment. Because of the dynamic structure such an environment
has, a modified version of an information board study was used.
In this dynamic information board, cell content is updated
during the information search process. This means that the par-
ticipant has to make two decisions – first, which information is
of interest and, second, when is the right time to access certain
information. Redlawsk compared a static information board
with a dynamic one and found a switch from compensatory to
non-compensatory strategies with an increase in complexity.
Additionally, more information was acquired for the finally
chosen candidate in comparison to the rejected one. Both findings
will not surprise scientists working with process tracing, because
they are well documented in many studies in this field. The
lesson from this study is the applicability of the method in a
very different domain than is generally used in decision-making
studies – the domain of political science and policy building.
The points I want to make with these examples are twofold.
First, the three studies show that despite the different perspec-
tives on human behavior, at least some approaches in psychology,
neuroscience, and political science use the same methods to
gather insights into human information acquisition. However,
the adaptation of new methodologies from other areas often
takes a long time, and one should be aware that the cited
studies (despite their quite recent publication dates) refer to
methods that have existed in psychology for more than 20 years.
The second point is that better models of decisions can be built
when the input-output level is left and the process actually happen-
ing during the information-acquisition phase of a decision is exam-
ined. Put simply, process models of human decision making require
process data. Using process methods, we can learn when and where
the participant sets her focus in her information search through the
timing and number of acquisitions of particular information items.
As such, we can get closer to underlying processes in the brain
when we observe transitions between information items. All of
this information would be unavailable if the level of data collection
were confined to only the responses of the participants – that is, to
their final choices. The wealth of information participants emit
when thinking and deciding is valuable, and perhaps critical, in
developing unified models in all of the behavioral sciences.
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